US Doesn’t Have The Money To Match Beijing’s “Belt-and-Road” Initiative (#GotBitcoin?)
Xi Jinping, looking to expand global program—and responding to criticism—invites multilateral input. US Doesn’t Have The Money To Match Beijing’s “Belt-and-Road” Initiative (#GotBitcoin?)
China has unleashed easy credit for more than five years to fuel its ambitions to build global infrastructure, heaping debt upon itself and other developing economies.
President Xi Jinping is now adjusting that strategy, pledging to reformulate his Belt and Road Initiative with greater emphasis on market principles and sustainability.
The U.S. and other countries have warned that aspects of the program pose financial risks to borrowers, alleging a lack of transparency and graft in deals that primarily benefit Beijing.
China doesn’t intend to go it alone, Mr. Xi said in a speech on Friday. He referred repeatedly to “Belt and Road cooperation,” inviting foreign and private-sector partners to play a bigger role.
“Going ahead, we should focus on priorities and project execution,” Mr. Xi said, “just like an architect refining the blueprint.”
His pledges at a Beijing forum, where he hosted three dozen foreign leaders, marked the highest-level acknowledgment that China’s efforts to export its speedy, government-led brand of development carry risks for participating countries, and itself.
While many developing countries have embraced Mr. Xi’s infrastructure program since its 2013 launch, doubts have festered over whether the primarily Chinese-funded and built projects are always worth the money.
In Pakistan, heavy debt associated with Chinese projects helped sway an election, while the cost of a highway in Montenegro has threatened to devour its budget. Kenya has argued that Chinese infrastructure building hasn’t created many jobs for locals, while Malaysia recently negotiated a one-third cut in the price of a railway project its officials suggested originated due to graft.
Those challenges are mounting amid pushback from the U.S. about how Beijing wants to reshape the global order and as China’s debt-heavy domestic economy faces new trouble.
Far from abandoning an initiative he has enshrined in his Communist Party’s governing charter, Mr. Xi outlined a more expansive definition of Belt and Road, stretching it beyond infrastructure-building into areas including international cooperation in education and media.
‘We need to pursue open, green and clean cooperation,” he said in his Friday speech.
Mr. Xi also called for more multilateral and commercial funding for infrastructure projects, a contrast to his pledges of Chinese financing in a similar speech two years ago.
Beijing is fine-tuning Belt and Road, according to Zhang Zhexin, an analyst at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. Its initial presentation was too broad and too loud, he said, and participating countries—often in distress—saw the program as a source of easy money from China.
“China just doesn’t have the resources to fulfill everyone’s demand,” Mr. Zhang said.
First pitched in 2013 as a platform to spur global development, the Belt and Road Initiative has pushed China’s massive construction, telecommunications and shipping companies to go global as a cooling domestic economy reduces business at home.
But as the program ballooned beyond infrastructure construction, Western officials—including from the U.S., which snubbed the Belt and Road forum—blamed it for advancing opaque financial deals that give Beijing political leverage by burdening countries with debt to China.
As criticism built over the past year or so, Beijing de-emphasized big-ticket infrastructure projects in its Belt and Road publicity and stepped up pledges to ensure sustainable lending and fight graft.
“Everything should be done in a transparent way and we should have a zero tolerance for corruption,” Mr. Xi said Friday.
As part of the oversight effort, Chinese officials have been negotiating with foreign governments to draw up lists of official Belt and Road projects, people familiar with the matter said, a move that would curb misuse of the Belt and Road label.
Ahead of Mr. Xi’s speech on Friday, Chinese officials appeared at side seminars to stress their attention to financial risks in the program and their desire to attract private-sector money.
“A country’s total debt capacity should be taken into account,” Yi Gang, governor of the People’s Bank of China, told a seminar on Thursday. “Private lending should be the mainstay” in financing projects to achieve sustainable development, he said.
International Monetary Fund Managing Director Christine Lagarde welcomed the shift in tone, telling the forum after Mr. Xi’s speech that the initiative could “benefit from increased transparency, open procurement with competitive bidding and better risk assessment in project selection.”
Some observers don’t expect China to slim down the Belt and Road program, despite Mr. Xi’s pledged adjustments.
Recalibrating Mr. Xi’s signature foreign policy is a welcome move but also “a big ask,” said George Magnus, an economist at Oxford University’s China Center. “To change its structure by incorporating Western ideas and values including the rule of law, full and open accounting, and market-based transparent lending standards and terms is most likely a bridge too far.”
China is adapting to current circumstances, but its long-term goals remain unchanged, said Kishore Mahbubani, a former senior Singapore diplomat who was in the audience for the Chinese leader’s speech. “They’re still rich in capital.”
Beijing’s more circumspect public messaging belied its highhanded approach when negotiating with some foreign diplomats during preparatory meetings for the forum, people familiar with the process said.
In meetings to draft a joint statement for Mr. Xi’s Saturday summit with foreign leaders, a Chinese diplomat chastised some negotiators, particularly European officials, after they pressed for references to best practices in business and investment, as well as human rights, the people familiar with the process said.
Guo Xuejun, a deputy director-general at China’s Foreign Ministry who chaired the meetings, accused the negotiators of showing disdain for Mr. Xi and China. He dismissed European requests for references to reciprocity as “American language,” referring to similar U.S. demands in trade talks with China, the people said.
“Remind me to disinvite your president,” Mr. Guo said at one point, according to the people, who said Chinese officials lodged diplomatic complaints against countries that sought amendments it disliked. China’s Foreign Ministry didn’t respond to a request for comment.
China Touts Its Belt-and-Road Effort As Collaborative, But Foreign Companies Feel Left Out
Beijing ‘is offering the financing, the building, the equipment—even the labor,’ an EU Chamber of Commerce official says.
Roughly seven years after Beijing launched a high-profile transcontinental infrastructure program aimed at building goodwill abroad and boosting economic cooperation with the rest of the world, some foreign companies say they are being left out of those projects.
Not only have a minuscule number of foreign companies been invited to participate in China’s Belt and Road initiative—a trillion-dollar flagship foreign-policy effort—but Beijing has also undercut its message of cooperation by keeping many partner nations at arm’s length, a new study by the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China argues. The initiative focuses mainly on infrastructure projects.
“China is offering the financing, the building, the equipment—even the labor,” said Jörg Wuttke, president of the Beijing-based European trade group. “That is a very closed system.”
China has framed the Belt and Road initiative as a way to more closely integrate its economy with those across Asia, Africa, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America, primarily through infrastructure projects. That has earned it comparisons to the Marshall Plan, under which Washington gave billions of dollars to help rebuild swaths of Europe and which placed the U.S. at the center of the postwar economic order.
During the first 11 months of 2019, Chinese companies signed 6,055 contracts in 61 countries as part of Belt and Road with a total value of $127.67 billion, an increase of 41.2% from the same period a year earlier, according to China’s Commerce Ministry.
The Belt and Road effort, however, has attracted criticism alleging that it lacks of transparency on financing, leading to charges of corruption, waste and out-of-control debt. President Xi Jinping has responded in part by recalibrating his signature program, pledging more transparency and financial sustainability.
However, the European Chamber, in its report published Thursday, said some apparently successful Belt and Road projects relied on large Chinese subsidies to stay afloat, quoting one logistics company that detailed handouts that heavily distorted market prices for freight traffic between Western China and Europe.
The trade group counted that just 20 of its 1,700 member companies in China had participated in the initiative. Those that did so joined because of existing relationships with the Chinese government or to lend technology expertise that couldn’t be supplied by Chinese companies, the chamber said.
Most of the participating companies did so through joint ventures with Chinese state-owned companies and in almost all cases held a small minority share in the project. Others had bid on Belt and Road-related projects, though very few were awarded the project, said the report, which pointed out the lack of an office or even a phone number for the initiative.
Geng Shuang, a Foreign Ministry spokesman, dismissed the European Chamber’s report as biased, saying the initiative was launched in a spirit of openness, inclusiveness and transparency.
Under the Belt and Road initiative, “Chinese and foreign companies follow the market rules and principle of fairness,” Mr. Geng said Thursday. He listed Germany’s Siemens and Deutsche Post’s DHL business, as well as France’s Schneider Electric, as examples of participating European businesses.
Siemens, which was among the first Western companies to work with Chinese companies on Belt and Road projects, opened an office in 2018 to oversee its involvement in the plan.
While some U.S. companies have shown interest, few have gotten directly involved. Most notable among them is General Electric Co., GE -0.25% which has partnered with Chinese state-owned enterprises on power-plant and grid projects in Africa. In July, Larry Culp, GE’s chairman and chief executive, met with Hao Peng, chairman of the body that oversees China’s state-owned assets, to discuss the Belt and Road initiative.
Some of the Belt and Road’s advertised participants had been only retroactively labeled as joining the effort, the European Chamber said. When a Chinese consortium won a bid in 2018 to build a bridge in Croatia as part of an EU-funded initiative to create transport, energy and digital connections between Europe and Asia, the Chinese news media were quick to laud it as a part of the Belt and Road initiative.
China’s Trillion-Dollar Campaign Fuels A Tech Race With The U.S.
Beijing plans to spend $1.4 trillion in the next five years in sectors including 5G, artificial intelligence and data centers.
China has embarked on a new trillion-dollar campaign to develop next-generation technologies as it seeks to catapult the communist nation ahead of the U.S. in critical areas.
Since the start of the year, municipal governments in Beijing, Shanghai and more than a dozen other localities have pledged 6.61 trillion yuan ($935 billion) to the cause, according to a Wall Street Journal tally. Chinese companies, urged on by authorities, are also putting up money.
Under a plan outlined earlier this year by China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, these efforts would contribute to at least $1.4 trillion in investments during the next five years in artificial intelligence, data centers, mobile communications and other projects.
At China’s annual legislative meeting last month, China’s Premier Li Keqiang said the campaign was a top priority of the Communist Party and would give the country a “new-style infrastructure.”
That marked a subtle shift from months earlier, when Chinese leaders played down their previous industrial policy, known as Made in China 2025. The Trump administration has pointed to that previous policy as evidence of Beijing’s intent to subsidize national champions and tilt the playing field against foreign companies.
A key aspect of Made in China revolved around replacing foreign tech components with local products, said Caroline Meinhardt, an analyst at the Mercator Institute for China Studies in Berlin. That goal hasn’t changed, even though the new plan doesn’t explicitly call for a similar push, she said.
China’s program is likely to add heat to the U.S.-China technology race as Beijing seeks a global edge in construction of superfast cellular networks known as 5G. It could also serve as an important source of economic stimulus to cushion the impact of the global coronavirus-related slowdown.
“China is still a heavily planned economy,” said Lester Ross, policy committee chairman at the American Chamber of Commerce in China. “Such plans are a significant driver of economic policies.”
The new campaign has a similar thrust to Made in China 2025, but is both more targeted at cutting-edge technologies and broader in its ambitions. It focuses on upgrading technology throughout the Chinese economy and relies mostly on investment from the private sector and local governments instead of national government spending.
Unlike utilities and roads, new-style infrastructure investments such as vehicle charging stations offer better returns for private investors, Sun Guojun, a senior official with China’s cabinet, the State Council, said at a news conference in late May. The central government would provide policy support to the campaign, partly as a bid to increase domestic demand, Mr. Sun said.
This week, Chinese cities Beijing and Guangzhou announced new spending and projects related to the plan. Beijing aims to build 13,000 new 5G base stations by the end of 2020, while Guangzhou officials said they would increase spending to 500 billion yuan, up from 180 billion yuan announced previously, according to the city’s government work report.
The government is pushing hardest for investment in building new 5G networks. Supercharged 5G mobile connections are expected to underpin a whole new world of next-generation connected devices, collectively known as the internet of things, that businesses believe could revolutionize daily life and manufacturing alike.
China hopes to more than triple the number of 5G base stations to 600,000 by the end of the year, according to the state-run Xinhua News Agency. In 2019, Bernstein Research said the U.S. was on pace to install 10,000 5G base stations by the end of that year.
In March, China’s three national telecom carriers collectively promised to invest about 220 billion yuan to build 5G base stations.
The rest of the money is slated to flow into the building of new data centers and intercity rail networks, development of homegrown artificial intelligence chips, smart factories, electric-vehicle charging stations and ultrahigh-voltage power facilities.
Local governments have rushed to announce their investments. Shanghai’s government said this April it would pump 270 billion yuan on artificial intelligence, the industrial internet of things and other advanced technologies. Neighboring Jiangsu province said it plans to invest 182 billion yuan in its own new infrastructure projects.
Tencent, which runs China’s popular do-everything app WeChat, said last month it would invest 500 billion yuan during the next five years in new infrastructure technologies like cloud computing and cybersecurity. Its rival, e-commerce giant Alibaba, pledged 200 billion yuan in similar outlays over three years.
In his work report last month, Mr. Li said the government planned to issue 3.75 trillion yuan in bonds and spend another 600 billion yuan to support the digital infrastructure push, as well as accelerate urbanization and upgrade traditional infrastructure like roads and bridges.
Preferential policies favoring Chinese companies mean foreign companies are unlikely to see much of a windfall from the campaign, foreign business groups said.
“Such an unfair playing field may exacerbate the current trend of global decoupling of supply chains and increase protectionism,” the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China said in a statement.
Continuing trade friction with the U.S. could hinder the rollout of the new Chinese plan, at least in the short term, as many of the Chinese companies involved still rely on the U.S. for critical components. That includes China’s dominant maker of 5G equipment, Huawei Technologies Co., which has been placed on a U.S. export blacklist.
Chinese leaders also have a track record of allowing political goals to skew industrial plans, leading to overspending in areas where there’s little demand, according to analysts.
“Demand for 5G in China isn’t quite there yet,” said Dan Wang, a technology analyst with research consultant GaveKal Dragonomics in Beijing. “For now, it remains a solution looking for a problem.”
What It’s Like Living Next To A Belt And Road Project
The real-life environmental and social impact of China’s infrastructure initiative shouldn’t be overlooked.
A lot has been written about China’s multibillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative. Economists have debated the debt dynamics. Political scientists have analyzed how it fits into the rising power’s geopolitical strategy. And climate experts have decried the emissions China is adding to the atmosphere by supporting fossil fuel projects.
Rarely do we hear from the people whose lives are directly affected by the program. Earlier this year, a coalition of activist groups published Belt and Road Through My Village, a compilation of interviews with about 100 local residents who live close to BRI projects in five Asian countries.
It was a chance for them to express their concerns, and the list is long: disputes over land use rights, water and air pollution, deforestation, and loss of indigenous culture are just some of the issues they raised. The stories are a powerful reminder to governments and investors to consider the environmental and social impact of the BRI.
Muhammad Asif, 42, used to work at the Sahiwal coal-fired power plant, a BRI project built on 690 hectares of fertile land between Karachi and Lahore — Pakistan’s two biggest cities. The plant created more than 3,000 jobs and has been held up as an example of the good the BRI can do.
But Asif worries about the damage the plant is doing to the land and air. “All this development work has its cost,” he says in the book. Contaminated water from the plant is released into a nearby canal that’s used for crop irrigation and drunk by cattle.
“We fear that this contaminated water may sicken our cattle and make our lands barren or, at least, contaminate the produce. Air pollution is also becoming a problem as people have begun suffering from nasal, skin and lung diseases,” he says.
China insists that BRI projects are strictly vetted for environmental impacts and are meant to benefit the people who live in those areas, but in practice it has fallen short in introducing concrete steps to limit its financing of carbon-intensive practices. Local communities have also complained about a lack of transparency around the projects.
That’s slowly changing as environmental concerns become a greater investment risk. In Myanmar, the $3.6 billion Myitsone hydroelectric dam co-developed by China Power Investment Corp. has been stalled since 2011 following large protests over the lack of a proper environmental assessment.
he license for a $2 billion coal power plant in Lamu was canceled by a tribunal in Kenya because the public wasn’t consulted. A China-funded dam under construction on the Indonesia island of Sumatra is also facing fierce protests for posing a serious threat to endangered orangutans.
As countries step up their climate commitments under the Paris Agreement, more governments are expected to turn away from coal and other projects that damage the environment.
Pakistan, for example, said at the Climate Ambition Summit this month that it will stop building coal-fired plants. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which is the centerpiece of the BRI, has been long criticized for increasing Pakistan’s dependence on coal.
“If coal-fired power is now being de-prioritized within CPEC, then it could also happen right across the BRI program,” says Simon Nicholas, an analyst at Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis.
Even as awareness grows within China that it has to manage such risks, the government has so far only issued non-binding recommendations to improve green standards in its overseas investments.
The BRI International Green Development Coalition, which is supervised by China’s environmental ministry, this month proposed a color-coded classification mechanism as a way to better assess environmental risks assessments. The system would be based on three major factors: pollution prevention, climate change mitigation and biodiversity conservation.
Projects that would cause “significant and irreversible” damage would mandate stricter supervision from the government, harder financing conditions and more stringent financing status disclosure requirements.
That sounds like step in the right direction, but the proposal is merely a suggestion. More government departments and state banks would have to get on board for it to be implemented.
What’s missing are laws that require environmental and social assessments for every overseas project the BRI is considering investing in, according to Wang Xiaojun, founder of People of Asia for Climate Solutions, a Manila-based nongovernmental organization which co-published the book. Policymakers need to understand that local concerns are real and will increasingly become an important factor in determining the success of a project, he says.
One of the official goals of the BRI is to enhance people-to-people communication. That’s “the hardest but also the most urgent,” says Wang. “To hear the people, instead of excluding them from the dialog, should be the first step to reach this goal.”
Japan Group To Lend Vietnam $1.8 Billion For Coal-Fired Power
Tokyo bucks backlash from investors and its own environment minister, citing project’s contribution to economic development.
A Japanese-led group said it would extend nearly $1.8 billion in loans to build a coal-fired power plant in Vietnam, bucking criticism about the project’s impact on climate goals.
Plans call for a total of 1.2 gigawatts of electricity output at the plant in central Vietnam’s Vung Ang district. Investors include Tokyo-based trading company Mitsubishi Corp.
The government-owned Japan Bank for International Cooperation said Tuesday it would lend slightly more than a third of the total $1.767 billion in financing for the project. It said the project would “contribute to economic development in Vietnam through the stable supply of electricity.” Japanese commercial banks and the Export-Import Bank of Korea are also providing financing.
The project has become a flashpoint in the debate over whether rich nations should continue supporting coal-fired power in developing nations with growing electricity demand.
Critics of the project include a group of international investors and Japan’s own environment minister, Shinjiro Koizumi, who is considered a potential future prime minister. In January, Mr. Koizumi said the project couldn’t gain the understanding of the international community.
An October letter signed by Nordea Asset Management, a unit of the Nordic region’s biggest lender with more than $200 billion in assets under management, and other investors called on companies involved in the Vietnam project to pull out. It said the plant was incompatible with the Paris climate accord.
“To build a coal-fired power plant with that scale is just incomprehensible,” said Eric Pedersen, Nordea’s head of responsible investments, in response to Tuesday’s move by Japan. “This looks like the last spasms of old-fashioned industrial policy where you just keep doing what you’ve been doing.”
Mr. Pedersen said he didn’t believe the Vietnam plant would operate long enough to make back the money invested in it, given rising international pressure against coal.
Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga, a supporter of the Paris accord, said Dec. 14 that “all countries must take bold action” to tackle the threat of climate change. However, the government in July said it would continue to finance coal-fired power plants in countries where other options cost more or carry national-security risks.
Japan and Vietnam enjoy close ties and share concerns about China’s rise. Vietnam was the first country Mr. Suga visited after taking office in September.
China In Talks With Kenya For Debt Relief After Paris Club Deal
China is in talks with Kenya on a debt-service suspension deal, its embassy in Nairobi said, days after the Paris Club agreed to delay $300 million in payments by the East African nation.
China signed payment suspension agreements with 12 African countries and gave waivers on mature interest-free loans for 15 African nations under the G-20 framework, the embassy said in an emailed statement, without providing details. The China International Development Cooperation Agency and the Export-Import Bank of China implemented all eligible debt suspension requests from the nations, it said.
Kenya’s second-biggest external creditor after the World Bank said it “attaches great importance to debt suspension and alleviation in African countries including Kenya and is committed to fully implementing the G-20 Debt Service Suspension Initiative,” according to the statement.
Kenya applied for waivers under the DSSI framework for about 40.6 billion shillings ($368.7 million) due in the first half of this year.
Chinese loans comprised 21% of Kenya’s external debt, compared with the World Bank’s 25% at the end of June 2020, according to a National Treasury report. Sovereign bondholders held another 19%, commercial banks 11% and the African Development Bank 7.5%.
China’s New Belt And Road Has Less Concrete, More Blockchain
The Covid-19 pandemic hasn’t been good for China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The virus “seriously affected” one-fifth of the projects in the China-centered infrastructure drive, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Djibouti, Laos, Maldives, Pakistan, and Zambia, among others, have asked China to renegotiate or forgive Belt and Road loans. Kyrgyzstan and Sri Lanka have already extracted concessions.
But Belt and Road isn’t going away. China is making more rigorous lending decisions while focusing somewhat less on heavy-duty construction and more on digital technology, says a Council on Foreign Relations task force report released on March 23.
The 190-page report, titled China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States, was written by Jennifer Hillman and David Sacks of the CFR based on the findings of an independent task force chaired by former Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew and retired Admiral Gary Roughead.
For the U.S., calibrating an effective response to Belt and Road is tricky. The Obama administration pursued constructive engagement with China. As Belt and Road ramped up and became more of a threat, the Trump administration was more confrontational, but without allies’ support.
The Biden administration aims to build more of a united front of nations to counter Chinese influence. Reflecting the difficulty of striking the right balance, the Council on Foreign Relations report says the U.S. response “has been too little, too late,” but also says “its blanket condemnation risks alienating partners.”
Tensions between the U.S. and China were clear on March 19 when both sides aired grievances in an hourslong meeting at a hotel in Anchorage, Alaska. “We expected to have tough and direct talks on a wide range of issues, and that’s exactly what we had,” U.S. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan told reporters afterward.
The U.S. has restricted sales of 5G wireless network gear from Huawei Technologies Co. and other Chinese suppliers and tried to get other countries to go along. But the Council on Foreign Relations report makes clear that the Digital Silk Road—the tech portion of Belt and Road—goes well beyond wireless networks.
It includes, among other things, Ant Group’s Alipay and Tencent’s WeChat Pay mobile payments apps. While Ant and Tencent are private companies, “they often use the BRI or Digital Silk Road label to gain domestic political support for their overseas commercial expansion and leverage the market access provided by BRI projects,” the report says.
China’s push in blockchain, if successful, could pose a serious threat to U.S. interests. Here’s a paragraph about that from the report:
Beijing is also focusing on blockchain ledgering. Chinese leaders believe that blockchain technology will be the foundational infrastructure for future technological innovation, and in 2020 Beijing launched the Blockchain Service Network (BSN). BSN is designed to leverage blockchain technology to offer software developers a cheaper alternative to current server storage space offerings.
A number of major blockchain projects have joined BSN, integrating their own chains with it, thereby enabling developers to create applications on the larger, less expensive BSN. Such integration also allows Beijing to bring this “international plumbing,” including the network infrastructure in Australia, Brazil, France, Japan, South Africa, and the United States, under its influence.
As China’s BSN white paper noted, “Once the BSN is deployed globally, it will become the only global infrastructure network autonomously innovated by Chinese entities and for which network access is Chinese-controlled.”
Belt and Road, says the report, “poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests.” It concludes that the U.S. shouldn’t attempt to “match China dollar for dollar or project for project.” Rather, it says, the U.S. should focus on areas where it can offer a “compelling alternative,” either on its own or with like-minded nations.
Among the specific recommendations: “reenergize the World Bank so that it can offer a better alternative to BRI,” and improve and then join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership, which is the successor to the trade agreement that President Trump dropped out of as one of his first acts in office.
Djibouti Says Ethiopia Conflict Hinders Economic Rebound
The speed of Djibouti’s economic recovery from a contraction last year hinges on how soon conflict ends in neighboring Ethiopia, Finance Minister Ilyas Dawaleh said.
“The recent and escalating conflict in Ethiopia is worsening prospects for regional peace, trade and undermines regional cooperation,” Dawaleh said in an emailed response to questions on April 10. “As a result of these external and internal factors, Djibouti’s economic recovery is likely to be a prolonged affair.”
Situated at the entrance to the Suez Canal, Djibouti is a major trade conduit for Ethiopia, Africa’s second-most populous country. Fighting in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region that erupted in November has exacerbated the impact of the coronavirus pandemic and raised economic uncertainty in that country.
Djibouti’s economy shrank 1% last year, and is forecast to expand 5% this year and 5.5% in 2022, according to the International Monetary Fund. The country, is targeting growth of 7% to 9% in the coming years, driven by port upgrades, investments in green energy and technology, Dawaleh said.
The country has been ruled by President Ismail Omar Guelleh, 73, for the past two decades. He secured a fifth term in an April 9 election, winning more than 97% of the vote, according to the state-owned La Nation newspaper.
Situated on one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes, Djibouti has become increasingly important to regional and world powers. Smaller than the U.S. state of Massachusetts, it hosts the largest U.S. military base in Africa in addition to a Chinese People’s Liberation Army support facility.
In June, the Horn of Africa nation announced the creation of a sovereign wealth fund that will target domestic and regional investments, focusing on industries including telecommunications, energy and logistics. The fund is targeting $1.5 billion of contributions within a decade.
“The Djibouti Sovereign Fund will play an important role to attract and generate more international private capital,” Dawaleh said.
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